The French Connection and Terrorism
564
Hidden for security reasons in the deep recesses of Paris’ Palace
of Justice, Jean- François Ricard leans back in his chair and smiles
coyly. “I can’t tell you any of these names while
is on, but it’s all based on proof!” Ricard, one of
France’s two elite Islamic terrorism judges, is referring to many
names—the names of terrorists he is pursuing, the names of countries
not cooperating with international investigations, the names of
governments who need to restructure their intelligence services so as
to better combat terrorism.
But the
evasive judge won’t say a word. There is too much at stake for Ricard,
who, along with his colleague Jean-Louis Bruguière, has become one of
the world’s experts on Islamic terrorism, having helped stop numerous
terrorist plots in Europe, Africa, and the U.S. His case files read like a Who’s Who of international
terrorists—Zacarias Moussaoui, Ahmed Ressam, Richard Reid—spanning the
globe, from Rwanda and Corsica to the Middle East and the United
States. But the most famous name appearing in his files is none other
than Osama bin Laden. Ricard has followed the Al Qaeda mastermind since
1994, from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Frankfurt and the U.S. As
a result, Ricard and his colleagues were concerned about attacks on the
U.S. well before 2001. “In the late ‘90s, the Americans
were mainly interested in the GIA [Armed Islamic Group, Algeria’s
extremist Islamic organization linked to attacks in Europe]. We were
already telling them they needed to look more internationally, that the
new terrorist networks were not directly identified with a particular
country. Even with the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993,
the U.S. did not, perhaps, feel the same need to react to the
threat as we did at that time. The U.S. had really started
to act by 2000, but you need more time than that. The fact is that
Islamic terrorism moves very fast.” So fast, that within
one year of having opened its first files on Islamic terrorist networks
in 1993, France saw its number of cases skyrocket to 200. In fact, it
was that growing number of files that created Ricard’s job, and that
makes it necessary for him to be accompanied by a bodyguard. The
anti-terrorism court is now led by Ricard, Bruguière and two judges
specialized in Basque and Corsican terrorism. All work in the Palace of
Justice; all are highly specialized in dealing with terrorism. This
anti-terrorism team selects the police with whom it will work, while
keeping in constant contact with France’s traditional intelligence
services. The key to France’s anti-terrorist system is
centralization—a continual exchange of information and coordination
between the police, intelligence, and judicial services. It is a system
that, except for Spain, is not found anywhere else in the Western
world.
“This is something that I believe is 100% necessary if you want to have an effective anti-terrorist operation,” says Ricard.
“You
look outside of France, and you’ll see that many countries will have
people that aren’t specialized enough, or that each different terrorism
case or network is treated by a different magistrate, a different
police division, or a different intelligence unit, which are often
spread across the country. That makes it very difficult when one is
dealing with a complex network.” Although Ricard
refuses to name names, the U.S. would certainly seem to serve as a good
example. Both the CIA and the FBI were heavily criticized for not
having picked up on the threat to U.S. soil prior to the September 11
attacks. In an oft-cited example of the groups’ disorganization, a memo
written two months before the attacks by a Phoenix FBI agent expressed
concern that U.S. flight schools were being used by Middle Eastern men
linked to Osama bin Laden and terrorist groups. Although the memo made
it to one of the FBI’s anti-terrorism units, it was never connected to
Zacarias Moussaoui, the French citizen who was detained in August after
having enrolled at a flight school in Minnesota. Moreover,
the French had warned the CIA of Moussaoui in mid-August 2001, but the
agency didn’t match his name to information provided earlier in the
year by an informant, who only knew of Moussaoui by an alias. It was an
oversight that would prove to be critical: Moussaoui is believed to
have helped plan the September attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda.
“The
weakness of the U.S. is, sometimes, its very greatness—its large
resources and specialists and intricate structures make it harder to
coordinate,” observes Ricard.
“Even with a very powerful
intelligence network, if you have hundreds of work teams,
although most useful information will get passed on, some won’t. With
our system, we can immediately see which elements connect to other
cases because those other files are right
next door. ” It comes as no surprise, then, that Ricard
praises the U.S. government’s efforts to restructure the FBI and CIA,
and is mild in his criticism of the Patriot Act, the post September
11-legislation that largely expanded police powers to allow government
agents to monitor phones and computers, review personal records, and
detain non-citizens. The act has come under heavy fire from civil
rights groups, which claim it amounts to nothing less than spying.
The
act also marks the first time the CIA and FBI have been allowed to mix
foreign intelligence with law enforcement—calling to mind Ricard’s
emphasis on the importance of having a centralized and highly
communicative anti-terrorism unit. And certainly, says Ricard, the
introduction of the Patriot Act has made it much easier for the U.S. to
rout terrorists.
“But is it
sufficient? I’m not so sure. The U.S. has really concentrated on
increasing its administrative and military powers in terms of finding
and treating terrorists. But it’s more difficult to rely as heavily on
these powers when you’re dealing with a . In my view
you need to have judiciary involvement.”
“The
American system gives so many rights to terrorists, and frankly, you
have to limit rights to a certain degree in the anti-terrorism fight.
But if you have a separate system, where an anti-terrorist court has
special powers that are not given to the administrative branch, that
are different from the classic criminal courts, then you have more of a
chance of respecting human rights, as well. Look at Moussaoui. And what
are you going to do about …
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Hidden for security reasons in the deep recesses of Paris’ Palace
of Justice, Jean- François Ricard leans back in his chair and smiles
coyly. “I can’t tell you any of these names while [the tape recorder]
is on, but it’s all based on proof!”
of Justice, Jean- François Ricard leans back in his chair and smiles
coyly. “I can’t tell you any of these names while [the tape recorder]
is on, but it’s all based on proof!”
Ricard, one of
France’s two elite Islamic terrorism judges, is referring to many
names—the names of terrorists he is pursuing, the names of countries
not cooperating with international investigations, the names of
governments who need to restructure their intelligence services so as
to better combat terrorism.
France’s two elite Islamic terrorism judges, is referring to many
names—the names of terrorists he is pursuing, the names of countries
not cooperating with international investigations, the names of
governments who need to restructure their intelligence services so as
to better combat terrorism.
But the
evasive judge won’t say a word. There is too much at stake for Ricard,
who, along with his colleague Jean-Louis Bruguière, has become one of
the world’s experts on Islamic terrorism, having helped stop numerous
terrorist plots in Europe, Africa, and the U.S.
evasive judge won’t say a word. There is too much at stake for Ricard,
who, along with his colleague Jean-Louis Bruguière, has become one of
the world’s experts on Islamic terrorism, having helped stop numerous
terrorist plots in Europe, Africa, and the U.S.
His case files read like a Who’s Who of international
terrorists—Zacarias Moussaoui, Ahmed Ressam, Richard Reid—spanning the
globe, from Rwanda and Corsica to the Middle East and the United
States. But the most famous name appearing in his files is none other
than Osama bin Laden. Ricard has followed the Al Qaeda mastermind since
1994, from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Frankfurt and the U.S. As
a result, Ricard and his colleagues were concerned about attacks on the
U.S. well before 2001.
terrorists—Zacarias Moussaoui, Ahmed Ressam, Richard Reid—spanning the
globe, from Rwanda and Corsica to the Middle East and the United
States. But the most famous name appearing in his files is none other
than Osama bin Laden. Ricard has followed the Al Qaeda mastermind since
1994, from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Frankfurt and the U.S. As
a result, Ricard and his colleagues were concerned about attacks on the
U.S. well before 2001.
“In the late ‘90s, the Americans
were mainly interested in the GIA [Armed Islamic Group, Algeria’s
extremist Islamic organization linked to attacks in Europe]. We were
already telling them they needed to look more internationally, that the
new terrorist networks were not directly identified with a particular
country. Even with the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993,
the U.S. did not, perhaps, feel the same need to react to the
[terrorism] threat as we did at that time. The U.S. had really started
to act by 2000, but you need more time than that. The fact is that
Islamic terrorism moves very fast.”
were mainly interested in the GIA [Armed Islamic Group, Algeria’s
extremist Islamic organization linked to attacks in Europe]. We were
already telling them they needed to look more internationally, that the
new terrorist networks were not directly identified with a particular
country. Even with the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993,
the U.S. did not, perhaps, feel the same need to react to the
[terrorism] threat as we did at that time. The U.S. had really started
to act by 2000, but you need more time than that. The fact is that
Islamic terrorism moves very fast.”
So fast, that within
one year of having opened its first files on Islamic terrorist networks
in 1993, France saw its number of cases skyrocket to 200. In fact, it
was that growing number of files that created Ricard’s job, and that
makes it necessary for him to be accompanied by a bodyguard. The
anti-terrorism court is now led by Ricard, Bruguière and two judges
specialized in Basque and Corsican terrorism. All work in the Palace of
Justice; all are highly specialized in dealing with terrorism. This
anti-terrorism team selects the police with whom it will work, while
keeping in constant contact with France’s traditional intelligence
services.
one year of having opened its first files on Islamic terrorist networks
in 1993, France saw its number of cases skyrocket to 200. In fact, it
was that growing number of files that created Ricard’s job, and that
makes it necessary for him to be accompanied by a bodyguard. The
anti-terrorism court is now led by Ricard, Bruguière and two judges
specialized in Basque and Corsican terrorism. All work in the Palace of
Justice; all are highly specialized in dealing with terrorism. This
anti-terrorism team selects the police with whom it will work, while
keeping in constant contact with France’s traditional intelligence
services.
The key to France’s anti-terrorist system is
centralization—a continual exchange of information and coordination
between the police, intelligence, and judicial services. It is a system
that, except for Spain, is not found anywhere else in the Western
world.
centralization—a continual exchange of information and coordination
between the police, intelligence, and judicial services. It is a system
that, except for Spain, is not found anywhere else in the Western
world.
“This is something that I believe is 100% necessary if you want to have an effective anti-terrorist operation,” says Ricard.
“You
look outside of France, and you’ll see that many countries will have
people that aren’t specialized enough, or that each different terrorism
case or network is treated by a different magistrate, a different
police division, or a different intelligence unit, which are often
spread across the country. That makes it very difficult when one is
dealing with a complex network.”
look outside of France, and you’ll see that many countries will have
people that aren’t specialized enough, or that each different terrorism
case or network is treated by a different magistrate, a different
police division, or a different intelligence unit, which are often
spread across the country. That makes it very difficult when one is
dealing with a complex network.”
Although Ricard
refuses to name names, the U.S. would certainly seem to serve as a good
example. Both the CIA and the FBI were heavily criticized for not
having picked up on the threat to U.S. soil prior to the September 11
attacks. In an oft-cited example of the groups’ disorganization, a memo
written two months before the attacks by a Phoenix FBI agent expressed
concern that U.S. flight schools were being used by Middle Eastern men
linked to Osama bin Laden and terrorist groups. Although the memo made
it to one of the FBI’s anti-terrorism units, it was never connected to
Zacarias Moussaoui, the French citizen who was detained in August after
having enrolled at a flight school in Minnesota.
refuses to name names, the U.S. would certainly seem to serve as a good
example. Both the CIA and the FBI were heavily criticized for not
having picked up on the threat to U.S. soil prior to the September 11
attacks. In an oft-cited example of the groups’ disorganization, a memo
written two months before the attacks by a Phoenix FBI agent expressed
concern that U.S. flight schools were being used by Middle Eastern men
linked to Osama bin Laden and terrorist groups. Although the memo made
it to one of the FBI’s anti-terrorism units, it was never connected to
Zacarias Moussaoui, the French citizen who was detained in August after
having enrolled at a flight school in Minnesota.
Moreover,
the French had warned the CIA of Moussaoui in mid-August 2001, but the
agency didn’t match his name to information provided earlier in the
year by an informant, who only knew of Moussaoui by an alias. It was an
oversight that would prove to be critical: Moussaoui is believed to
have helped plan the September attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda.
the French had warned the CIA of Moussaoui in mid-August 2001, but the
agency didn’t match his name to information provided earlier in the
year by an informant, who only knew of Moussaoui by an alias. It was an
oversight that would prove to be critical: Moussaoui is believed to
have helped plan the September attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda.
“The
weakness of the U.S. is, sometimes, its very greatness—its large
resources and specialists and intricate structures make it harder to
coordinate,” observes Ricard.
“Even with a very powerful
intelligence network, if you have hundreds of [terrorism] work teams,
although most useful information will get passed on, some won’t. With
our system, we can immediately see which elements connect to other
cases [that we are dealing with] because those other files are right
next door. ”
intelligence network, if you have hundreds of [terrorism] work teams,
although most useful information will get passed on, some won’t. With
our system, we can immediately see which elements connect to other
cases [that we are dealing with] because those other files are right
next door. ”
It comes as no surprise, then, that Ricard
praises the U.S. government’s efforts to restructure the FBI and CIA,
and is mild in his criticism of the Patriot Act, the post September
11-legislation that largely expanded police powers to allow government
agents to monitor phones and computers, review personal records, and
detain non-citizens. The act has come under heavy fire from civil
rights groups, which claim it amounts to nothing less than spying.
praises the U.S. government’s efforts to restructure the FBI and CIA,
and is mild in his criticism of the Patriot Act, the post September
11-legislation that largely expanded police powers to allow government
agents to monitor phones and computers, review personal records, and
detain non-citizens. The act has come under heavy fire from civil
rights groups, which claim it amounts to nothing less than spying.
The
act also marks the first time the CIA and FBI have been allowed to mix
foreign intelligence with law enforcement—calling to mind Ricard’s
emphasis on the importance of having a centralized and highly
communicative anti-terrorism unit. And certainly, says Ricard, the
introduction of the Patriot Act has made it much easier for the U.S. to
rout terrorists.
act also marks the first time the CIA and FBI have been allowed to mix
foreign intelligence with law enforcement—calling to mind Ricard’s
emphasis on the importance of having a centralized and highly
communicative anti-terrorism unit. And certainly, says Ricard, the
introduction of the Patriot Act has made it much easier for the U.S. to
rout terrorists.
“But is it
sufficient? I’m not so sure. The U.S. has really concentrated on
increasing its administrative and military powers in terms of finding
and treating terrorists. But it’s more difficult to rely as heavily on
these powers when you’re dealing with a [domestic search]. In my view
you need to have judiciary involvement.”
sufficient? I’m not so sure. The U.S. has really concentrated on
increasing its administrative and military powers in terms of finding
and treating terrorists. But it’s more difficult to rely as heavily on
these powers when you’re dealing with a [domestic search]. In my view
you need to have judiciary involvement.”
“The
American system gives so many rights to terrorists, and frankly, you
have to limit rights to a certain degree in the anti-terrorism fight.
But if you have a separate system, where an anti-terrorist court has
special powers that are not given to the administrative branch, that
are different from the classic criminal courts, then you have more of a
chance of respecting human rights, as well. Look at Moussaoui. And what
are you going to do about [those detained at] Guantanamo? Judge them?”
American system gives so many rights to terrorists, and frankly, you
have to limit rights to a certain degree in the anti-terrorism fight.
But if you have a separate system, where an anti-terrorist court has
special powers that are not given to the administrative branch, that
are different from the classic criminal courts, then you have more of a
chance of respecting human rights, as well. Look at Moussaoui. And what
are you going to do about [those detained at] Guantanamo? Judge them?”
The
Moussaoui case is certainly problematic: the alleged “20th
hijacker” has chosen to represent himself in court, but is not cleared
to receive certain information that concerns the case, as is a
defendant’s constitutional right. A U.S. trial judge in April
questioned whether such secrecy made it possible for the government to
continue with a public trial, and if an appeals court decides to affirm
Moussoui’s right to access the information, the government could decide
to drop the case in favor of a more secretive military tribunal.
If convicted, Moussaoui could face the death penalty.
Moussaoui case is certainly problematic: the alleged “20th
hijacker” has chosen to represent himself in court, but is not cleared
to receive certain information that concerns the case, as is a
defendant’s constitutional right. A U.S. trial judge in April
questioned whether such secrecy made it possible for the government to
continue with a public trial, and if an appeals court decides to affirm
Moussoui’s right to access the information, the government could decide
to drop the case in favor of a more secretive military tribunal.
If convicted, Moussaoui could face the death penalty.
But
if one sidesteps the human rights issue, what about the apparent
success of the U.S. “war” on terror? There have been no attacks on the
U.S. since September 11, or, as many Americans worried, since the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. Does that mean security is that much tighter? Have
these new administrative powers made the anti-terrorism fight more
effective? Not so fast, says the judge.
if one sidesteps the human rights issue, what about the apparent
success of the U.S. “war” on terror? There have been no attacks on the
U.S. since September 11, or, as many Americans worried, since the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. Does that mean security is that much tighter? Have
these new administrative powers made the anti-terrorism fight more
effective? Not so fast, says the judge.
Although
the international fight against terrorism has indeed weakened many of
the networks, the struggle is far from over. Keep in mind, says Ricard,
that the Iraq war has just ended. Recent history shows that the
networks’ big attacks are planned anywhere from six months to two years
in advance.
the international fight against terrorism has indeed weakened many of
the networks, the struggle is far from over. Keep in mind, says Ricard,
that the Iraq war has just ended. Recent history shows that the
networks’ big attacks are planned anywhere from six months to two years
in advance.
And then Ricard
pauses, as if questioning how to word his next statement. “Also, we’re
talking about Islamic terrorist attacks. And here in France, as you
know, we don’t have quite the same perspective [as the U.S.] on the
connection between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Islamic terrorist
networks. The question is, do the Islamic terrorist networks have any
more interest in punishing the Americans after the Iraq attacks?
I’m not so certain. During the entire time I’ve been here, I’ve never
seen an Islamist take up the defense of Saddam Hussein. Could the
images of suffering Iraqis reinforce hatred of the Americans? Sure, but
it’s not going to make them a greater target.”
pauses, as if questioning how to word his next statement. “Also, we’re
talking about Islamic terrorist attacks. And here in France, as you
know, we don’t have quite the same perspective [as the U.S.] on the
connection between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Islamic terrorist
networks. The question is, do the Islamic terrorist networks have any
more interest in punishing the Americans after the Iraq attacks?
I’m not so certain. During the entire time I’ve been here, I’ve never
seen an Islamist take up the defense of Saddam Hussein. Could the
images of suffering Iraqis reinforce hatred of the Americans? Sure, but
it’s not going to make them a greater target.”
It
was bound to come up at some point: the French opposition to the war.
Ricard is not about to give his perspective of the war on the
record—his opinion, he says, has nothing to do with his job as a
terrorism magistrate. But he will say that France is no less of a
target than the U.S.
was bound to come up at some point: the French opposition to the war.
Ricard is not about to give his perspective of the war on the
record—his opinion, he says, has nothing to do with his job as a
terrorism magistrate. But he will say that France is no less of a
target than the U.S.
“Islamic
terrorists are people who have chosen to undertake a jihad to the death
against their country or certain countries. The jihad isn’t simply a
war against Western values. It is above all a reaction against the
leaders of Muslim countries who haven’t adopted radical Islam and have
instead chosen more Western options to govern their countries. So this
choice is not going to change just because [France] chooses to react in
a way slightly different than [the U.S.] during a conflict. To believe
that France’s position will change its vulnerability to the terrorists
is completely false,” says Ricard, shaking his head. “The three main
targets have been, and will continue to be, the U.S., Israel, and
France.”
terrorists are people who have chosen to undertake a jihad to the death
against their country or certain countries. The jihad isn’t simply a
war against Western values. It is above all a reaction against the
leaders of Muslim countries who haven’t adopted radical Islam and have
instead chosen more Western options to govern their countries. So this
choice is not going to change just because [France] chooses to react in
a way slightly different than [the U.S.] during a conflict. To believe
that France’s position will change its vulnerability to the terrorists
is completely false,” says Ricard, shaking his head. “The three main
targets have been, and will continue to be, the U.S., Israel, and
France.”
In fact, the judge has not
seen his workload increase since the international debate on whether to
invade Iraq began last year. But he has noticed a definite change in
the nature of his files: an increased number of suspected terrorists
who are much older and stronger, with more fervent beliefs and greater
operational and technical expertise: in other words, fewer cases,
but much more powerful players.
seen his workload increase since the international debate on whether to
invade Iraq began last year. But he has noticed a definite change in
the nature of his files: an increased number of suspected terrorists
who are much older and stronger, with more fervent beliefs and greater
operational and technical expertise: in other words, fewer cases,
but much more powerful players.
Of course,
this change only increases the strength of these networks, which rely
on members’ multifaceted expertise and strong beliefs.
this change only increases the strength of these networks, which rely
on members’ multifaceted expertise and strong beliefs.
“This
is not ‘traditional’ terrorism, with an organization that is fairly
structured, like the ETA in Basque country, the IRA in Ireland, or the
PKK in Turkey. The Islamic terrorists are different. Here you have a
situation where the people are always moving, always changing. Someone
who was trained in Afghanistan will have acquired a variety of skills.
He can be doing something strictly operational, but he can also just as
easily be working within financing or logistics. In most cases, he’s
not going to have a definitive function or a definitive geographic
specialty. Once he returns from his training in Afghanistan he can work
anywhere, in the Middle East, in Bosnia, or a jihad in Chechnya.”
is not ‘traditional’ terrorism, with an organization that is fairly
structured, like the ETA in Basque country, the IRA in Ireland, or the
PKK in Turkey. The Islamic terrorists are different. Here you have a
situation where the people are always moving, always changing. Someone
who was trained in Afghanistan will have acquired a variety of skills.
He can be doing something strictly operational, but he can also just as
easily be working within financing or logistics. In most cases, he’s
not going to have a definitive function or a definitive geographic
specialty. Once he returns from his training in Afghanistan he can work
anywhere, in the Middle East, in Bosnia, or a jihad in Chechnya.”
Case
in point: Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian national and Canadian resident
convicted of attempting a terrorist attack on Los Angeles International
Airport in December 1999. Ressam trained in Afghan and
Pakistani terrorist camps in the early 1990s before entering Canada
with a phony French passport in 1994, and was arrested by U.S. Customs
as he tried to enter Washington from Canada in a car filled with
chemicals, explosives, and timing devices.
in point: Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian national and Canadian resident
convicted of attempting a terrorist attack on Los Angeles International
Airport in December 1999. Ressam trained in Afghan and
Pakistani terrorist camps in the early 1990s before entering Canada
with a phony French passport in 1994, and was arrested by U.S. Customs
as he tried to enter Washington from Canada in a car filled with
chemicals, explosives, and timing devices.
The
difficulty in targeting Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist networks
lies in their lack of specific geographic target and permanence, where
someone like Ressam can rise to an important position shortly after
attending the training camps.
difficulty in targeting Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist networks
lies in their lack of specific geographic target and permanence, where
someone like Ressam can rise to an important position shortly after
attending the training camps.
“This
is a world-wide jihad, a jihad that doesn’t need to attack just one
country just one time. It’s not enough to kill a network leader because
there is a permanent system that allows for reconstruction. Each time
an important leader is arrested, he is immediately replaced by someone
else, because under such a system a secondary player can, within two or
three years, become very important,” observes the judge.
is a world-wide jihad, a jihad that doesn’t need to attack just one
country just one time. It’s not enough to kill a network leader because
there is a permanent system that allows for reconstruction. Each time
an important leader is arrested, he is immediately replaced by someone
else, because under such a system a secondary player can, within two or
three years, become very important,” observes the judge.
Nevertheless,
Ricard admits that finding Osama bin Laden, the suspected mastermind
behind the September 11 attacks, will mark an important step.
Ricard admits that finding Osama bin Laden, the suspected mastermind
behind the September 11 attacks, will mark an important step.
“He
may not be directing Al Qaeda right now, but he is still very important
financially for the network and, certainly, as a symbol, it is very
important to find him. Keep in mind, these are people who are acting in
the name of God, so everything that is symbolic carries an enormous
weight.”
may not be directing Al Qaeda right now, but he is still very important
financially for the network and, certainly, as a symbol, it is very
important to find him. Keep in mind, these are people who are acting in
the name of God, so everything that is symbolic carries an enormous
weight.”
But listening to Ricard
talk, it is clear that Osama is not the only concern. Al Qaeda extends
far beyond the elusive leader, and there are still many key figures in
the Islamic terrorist networks that remain at large.
talk, it is clear that Osama is not the only concern. Al Qaeda extends
far beyond the elusive leader, and there are still many key figures in
the Islamic terrorist networks that remain at large.
“This
is just the beginning!” declares Ricard. “Those who believe that the
work in Afghanistan or Pakistan is done are very wrong…Since September
11 there has been an explosion of terrorist networks—Indonesia,
Chechnya—and don’t forget that Al Qaeda is still around,” he says.
is just the beginning!” declares Ricard. “Those who believe that the
work in Afghanistan or Pakistan is done are very wrong…Since September
11 there has been an explosion of terrorist networks—Indonesia,
Chechnya—and don’t forget that Al Qaeda is still around,” he says.
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