The French Connection and Terrorism

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Hidden for security reasons in the deep recesses of Paris’ Palace of Justice, Jean- François Ricard leans back in his chair and smiles coyly. “I can’t tell you any of these names while is on, but it’s all based on proof!” Ricard, one of France’s two elite Islamic terrorism judges, is referring to many names—the names of terrorists he is pursuing, the names of countries not cooperating with international investigations, the names of governments who need to restructure their intelligence services so as to better combat terrorism.   But the evasive judge won’t say a word. There is too much at stake for Ricard, who, along with his colleague Jean-Louis Bruguière, has become one of the world’s experts on Islamic terrorism, having helped stop numerous terrorist plots in Europe, Africa, and the U.S.   His case files read like a Who’s Who of international terrorists—Zacarias Moussaoui, Ahmed Ressam, Richard Reid—spanning the globe, from Rwanda and Corsica to the Middle East and the United States. But the most famous name appearing in his files is none other than Osama bin Laden. Ricard has followed the Al Qaeda mastermind since 1994, from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Frankfurt and the U.S.  As a result, Ricard and his colleagues were concerned about attacks on the U.S. well before 2001. “In the late ‘90s, the Americans were mainly interested in the GIA [Armed Islamic Group, Algeria’s extremist Islamic organization linked to attacks in Europe]. We were already telling them they needed to look more internationally, that the new terrorist networks were not directly identified with a particular country. Even with the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the U.S. did not, perhaps, feel the same need to react to the threat as we did at that time. The U.S. had really started to act by 2000, but you need more time than that. The fact is that Islamic terrorism moves very fast.” So fast, that within one year of having opened its first files on Islamic terrorist networks in 1993, France saw its number of cases skyrocket to 200. In fact, it was that growing number of files that created Ricard’s job, and that makes it necessary for him to be accompanied by a bodyguard.  The anti-terrorism court is now led by Ricard, Bruguière and two judges specialized in Basque and Corsican terrorism. All work in the Palace of Justice; all are highly specialized in dealing with terrorism. This anti-terrorism team selects the police with whom it will work, while keeping in constant contact with France’s traditional intelligence services. The key to France’s anti-terrorist system is centralization—a continual exchange of information and coordination between the police, intelligence, and judicial services. It is a system that, except for Spain, is not found anywhere else in the Western world.   “This is something that I believe is 100% necessary if you want to have an effective anti-terrorist operation,” says Ricard. “You look outside of France, and you’ll see that many countries will have people that aren’t specialized enough, or that each different terrorism case or network is treated by a different magistrate, a different police division, or a different intelligence unit, which are often spread across the country. That makes it very difficult when one is dealing with a complex network.” Although Ricard refuses to name names, the U.S. would certainly seem to serve as a good example. Both the CIA and the FBI were heavily criticized for not having picked up on the threat to U.S. soil prior to the September 11 attacks. In an oft-cited example of the groups’ disorganization, a memo written two months before the attacks by a Phoenix FBI agent expressed concern that U.S. flight schools were being used by Middle Eastern men linked to Osama bin Laden and terrorist groups. Although the memo made it to one of the FBI’s anti-terrorism units, it was never connected to Zacarias Moussaoui, the French citizen who was detained in August after having enrolled at a flight school in Minnesota. Moreover, the French had warned the CIA of Moussaoui in mid-August 2001, but the agency didn’t match his name to information provided earlier in the year by an informant, who only knew of Moussaoui by an alias. It was an oversight that would prove to be critical: Moussaoui is believed to have helped plan the September attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda. “The weakness of the U.S. is, sometimes, its very greatness—its large resources and specialists and intricate structures make it harder to coordinate,” observes Ricard. “Even with a very powerful intelligence network, if you have hundreds of work teams, although most useful information will get passed on, some won’t. With our system, we can immediately see which elements connect to other cases because those other files are right next door. ” It comes as no surprise, then, that Ricard praises the U.S. government’s efforts to restructure the FBI and CIA, and is mild in his criticism of the Patriot Act, the post September 11-legislation that largely expanded police powers to allow government agents to monitor phones and computers, review personal records, and detain non-citizens. The act has come under heavy fire from civil rights groups, which claim it amounts to nothing less than spying.   The act also marks the first time the CIA and FBI have been allowed to mix foreign intelligence with law enforcement—calling to mind Ricard’s emphasis on the importance of having a centralized and highly communicative anti-terrorism unit. And certainly, says Ricard, the introduction of the Patriot Act has made it much easier for the U.S. to rout terrorists.   “But is it sufficient? I’m not so sure. The U.S. has really concentrated on increasing its administrative and military powers in terms of finding and treating terrorists. But it’s more difficult to rely as heavily on these powers when you’re dealing with a . In my view you need to have judiciary involvement.”     “The American system gives so many rights to terrorists, and frankly, you have to limit rights to a certain degree in the anti-terrorism fight. But if you have a separate system, where an anti-terrorist court has special powers that are not given to the administrative branch, that are different from the classic criminal courts, then you have more of a chance of respecting human rights, as well. Look at Moussaoui. And what are you going to do about …
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